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In Southeast and Northeast Asia rice is not just a staple food but a fundamental part of livelihood 
and also a matter of national security. As such opening the rice market has been a continuously thorny 
issue for trade negotiations in this region. Although the region has trended toward free trade 
agreements and economic integration in recent decades, the analysis illustrates that most countries 
have established a set of robust institutions to safeguard their rice markets. Given the apparent benefits 
that the rice liberalization could bring to the region, countries should exert concerted efforts to break 
impasse in rice trade negotiations. This research suggests that efforts to build regional community and 
rice trade liberalization move in tandem. In order to materialize the benefits of an integrated and 
liberalized rice market, a regional governance framework that would instill confidence in region’s rice 
market needs to be established.  
 






Globalization has propagated political and economic institutions that blurred cultural and 
physical boundaries, imposing a relatively homogeneous amalgam of symbols in almost 
every corner of the globe. At the same time, there has been a resurgence of the concept of 
region, expressed by the emergence of a number of regional blocs. Although region is not a 
new subject of study in the field of International Relations, the eruption of set of countries 
acting as coalitions for economic and political purposes in the latter decades of the twentieth 
century reinstalled the idea of place, areas and regions as a branch of study in International 
Relations. In trade affairs two trends, ‘Globalism’ and ‘Regionalism,’ have their expressions 
through international organizations promoting multilateral agreements such as WTO striving 
to set global agreements without discrimination, and regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
promoting trade arrangements specific to members only (Sato, 2004). Southeast and 
Northeast Asia also has become a fundamental part of this discourse.
1
  
Although opening agricultural markets has been a continuously thorny issue for trade 
negotiations in other regions as well, it has presented a major roadblock to trade negotiation 
in Southeast and Northeast Asia where millions of households rely on agriculture for their 
livelihood (FAO, WFP and IFAD, 2012). Of a variety of agricultural products, rice deserves 
special attention. In Southeast and Northeast Asia rice is a fundamental part of not just the 
economy, but the society as a whole. As a commodity, rice is “a staple [food] for nearly half 
of the world’s seven billion people . . . more than 90 percent of this rice is consumed in Asia, 
where it is a staple for a majority of the population, including the region’s 560 million 
                                                          
1 This paper focuses on the Southeast and Northeast Asian region, represented by the ASEAN member 
countries and China, Japan and South Korea. 
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hungry people” (Mohanty, 2013: 44). In addition, rice is “the most widely planted crop in the 
region,” “the most important expenditure item for poor households” and “a fundamental part 
of local culture” (Dawe, 2013: 2).  Given the status of rice in this region, it is quite natural 
that during trade negotiations rice emerges as a commodity that generates concerns over 
instabilities within many countries and households (Timmer and Dawe, 2010). 
During negotiations over the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) nations decided not to include rice in trade discussions to reach certain agreements 
(Mangabat and Natividad, 2007). During the negotiations over the FTA between ASEAN 
and South Korea, the latter “insisted that rice be omitted from any agreement . . .  which led 
Thailand to opt out of the ASEAN-Korea negotiations in 2006” (Pomfret, 2011: 85). Japan’s 
decision to join Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is largely dependent on whether or not Japan 
has to open its rice market to acquire membership (Cheong, 2013). The extremely sensitive 
nature of rice in Southeast and Northeast Asia has pressed countries to pursue a policy of 
self-sufficiency on rice (Dawe, 2013), reinforcing national policies to protect rice market 
which in turn has engendered more volatility and uncertainty in global rice market (Razzaque 
and Laurent, 2008). Despite the importance of rice to trade liberalization and regional 
integration in Southeast and Northeast Asia, there is a relative dearth of research 
investigating region’s rice policies in comparative context and their relationship with trade 
liberalization and regional integration.  
It is against this backdrop that this research attempts to accomplish the followings. The 
first section of the research reviews the process of regionalization and trade negotiations in 
Southeast and Northeast Asia. The second section analyzes how negotiations on agricultural 
products, particularly rice have progressed in the region. The sections that follow investigate 
the ways in which rice strategies and rice trade policies of Southeast and Northeast Asian 
countries complicate the prospects of trade liberalization in the region and its links with 
regional integration. Finally, the paper proposes recommendations on rice trade liberalization 
in Southeast and Northeast Asia. 
 
 
2. REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST AND NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
Southeast and Northeast Asia is a region difficult to characterize; its denomination as a 
region has been a subject of long and controversial debate among experts from different 
disciplines. Southeast and Northeast Asia is a unique region, extremely diverse in geographic 
patterns, demography, religion, language, customs, etc. In fact, the idea of Southeast and 
Northeast Asia as a region has been developed only from the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries; this is why several experts claim that the “concept of Asia or East Asia as a region 
is relatively modern” (Pomfret, 2011: 8). The preference for preservation of state sovereignty 
of nascent states has been “a large obstacle to adopting a supranational institutional 
approach” (Sato, 2004: 223).  
Agricultural trade liberalization, and rice liberalization in particular, has been profoundly 
affected by the conditions of trade partnership the world has experienced during the last 
century. In the case of Southeast and Northeast Asia, the first regional arrangement was 
promoted by the United Nations with the establishment of the Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in 1947, with the purpose of facilitating 
economic progress in the region. In 1966 the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) was 




created to help developing countries to improve their links of cooperation and preferential 
trade mechanisms.  
In 1966 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was established to assist project funding 
and investment. In 1967 the Association of South East Asia (ASA)
 
evolved to the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) including the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the recently created state of Singapore.
2
 Although these organizations 
functioned as mechanism of dialogue and support of economic development, they failed to 
offer strategic guidelines towards regional integration. In reality, in this period most 
Southeast and Northeast Asian countries were more preoccupied with state building and 
developments within their own territorial boundaries than with building regional community. 
The lack of commitment to regional partnership was evident, as ASEAN failed to devise a 
strategy of cooperative development and industrialization. As one expert aptly put, 
“members wanted to support their own import-competing industries but unwilling to support 
their partners’ uncompetitive industries” (Pomfret, 2011: 16). During this incipient stage of 
regional community building, the region lacked a vision and also will towards integration. 
Countries adopted self-centered development strategies and intra-regional economic 
exchanges were minimal at best. Nonetheless, regional organizations such as ASEAN and 
ESCAP served as forum of dialogue, hence generating mutual respect and cooperation that 
resulted in a more serious discussion on regional integration in later years. 
One can claim that a turning point was the launch of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) by Asian and Pacific countries. APEC aimed to promote open 
regionalism consistent with WTO negotiations; it was a mechanism to conduct simultaneous 
negotiations along with WTO in order to facilitate global agreements on trade, and at the 
same time promoting cooperation and integration beyond trade issues. Since its creation 
“APEC members have shown significant increase in trade dependency” (Sato, 2004: 224). 
However, the organization did not work as the catalyst that some members expected for a 
genuine progress in trade liberalization.  
During the 1990s Southeast and Northeast Asian countries had undergone important 
transformations. South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines experienced transitions to 
democracies in what was dubbed as the ‘third wave of democratization’ (Huntington, 1991). 
China successfully consolidated its economic reform, hence becoming the engine of world 
economic growth; Vietnam was also on a path to similar economic reform. In general, the 
region was shifting to open market economies wherein the intra-regional trade was 
increasing considerably.  
Meanwhile, ASEAN had gained terrain in several regional matters. In the realm of trade, 
it held its first tariff agreement in 1976 at the Bali Summit, establishing preferential tariffs 
and industrial cooperation. These measures did not have significant impact on economic 
integration because the intra-regional market exchange was at nascent stage. By the 
beginning of 1990s trade talks in the region took a different turn; the new international 
environment such as increasing importance of APEC in the region prompted a new agenda 
for trade negotiation within ASEAN. The organization announced in 1992 the establishment 
of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008. ASEAN was expanding its membership to 
include Brunei Darussalam in 1984 and Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Vietnam in 
1995. 
                                                          
2 Primarily, ASA was a bloc of countries opposed to the advance of communism in the region. It was 
created to balance against a group of states aligned with the Soviet Bloc. 
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Beginning 2000s the region has experienced an important leap toward trade negotiations. 
Bilateral and plurilateral negotiations led to a number of free trade agreements (FTA’s), and 
at the same time ASEAN itself was being reinforced. As Harvie and Lee point out, in “recent 
years a new regionalism has begun to emerge in East Asia that represents a clear break from 
the region’s strong history of multilateralism” (Harvie and Lee, 2002: 2). What sparked this 
renewed interest in regionalism? Experts seem to agree on the importance of the role that the 
1997 Asian financial crisis played (Völgyi, 2011). The Asian financial crisis demonstrated 
not only the vulnerabilities of the global financial system, but also the high level of 
interdependence that Southeast and Northeast Asian financial sector had reached. The 
seriousness of the crisis forced countries to work toward closer economic cooperation, with 
China taking a leading role in providing monetary stability.
3
 A number of proposals that 
emerged after the crisis to create a more robust Asian economic system worked as facilitator 
for a more serious discussion of economic integration in the region. The Japanese idea of 
establishing an Asian Monetary Fund and the Chiang Mai initiative to establish regional 
financial safety net unleashed earnest debates over the path that the region should follow to 
reach a greater stage of economic and institutional integration. In this endeavor, ASEAN 
held meetings with China, Japan and South Korea in the context of what would be the 
beginning of the ASEAN+3. 
ASEAN+3 marks an important step toward regionalism in Southeast and Northeast Asia 
because it is the first serious and viable project to reach a trade agreement among Southeast 
Asia and China, South Korea and Japan. The expectations were high since ASEAN+3 could 
bring together potentials of developing countries with advantages of highly industrialized 
economies such as Japan and South Korea and the world’s new economic engine, China. 
Meanwhile, AFTA established an ambitious agenda to reduce tariff to the range of 0 to 5 
percent by 2007, creating a new scheme for sensitive products by 2010 for most of ASEAN 
member states, and by 2013 in case of Vietnam, by 2015 for Laos and Myanmar and by 2017 
for Cambodia. Along with AFTA, a variety of regional projects have emerged. For instance, 
the East Asian Economic Caucus was established to promote the idea of Asianism, excluding 
non-regional economies such as the US, whereas the East Asia Summit (EAS) has embraced 
non-Asian countries. Major stakeholder countries in the region such as Russia, the US, and 
Japan proposed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPA), an agreement 
on trade and other fields of cooperation between ASEAN+3 and Australia, New Zealand, and 
India. In years to come the epicenter of economic growth will be located in the Asia Pacific 
(Rosales and Kuwayama, 2012). This rationale has been translated into the idea of Trans-




<Table 1> summarizes varying trade engagements of different countries in the region. 
The most important recent trend impacting trade negotiations in the region has been free 
trade agreements (FTAs), prompted by the lack of progress in WTO negotiations. FTAs have 
been negotiated as a bloc by ASEAN, whereas Northeast Asian countries have pursued  
                                                          
3 China decided not to depreciate its currency, trying to take a role of leadership in the crisis, as well as 
enhance its image of cooperative rising superpower.  
4 The TPP has been considered as an attempt to overcome current problems over trade negotiations. It 
was first signed by the so-called P4 (Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore). 
Currently negotiations are taking place between the US, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Mexico, Malaysia, 
Canada and Japan. 




Table 1. Current Status of Trade Agreements in Southeast and Northeast Asian Countries 
 
 
bilateral trade agreements. Agricultural products, particularly rice, have been exceptions to 
region’s growing trend to trade liberalization. The following section investigates the way rice 
has complicated trade liberalization in the region. 
 
 
3. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON RICE IN SOUTHEAST AND NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
3.1 Political Economy of Rice in the Region  
 
Agricultural trade liberalization “has been a sensitive issue in trade negotiations due to 
the economic and political significance” (Mangabat and Natividad, 2007: 48). In WTO 
negotiations, for instance, agricultural products have consistently played out as a major 
source of impediments. In Asia, this issue has been particularly sticking out due to the 
relevance of agriculture in the region. Agriculture is a politically significant sector in many 
countries in the region regardless of the level of industrialization. As Sato aptly put, “the 
most industrialized countries in the region (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) have politically 
significant agriculture sectors, constituting an ‘Achilles heel’ in their pursuit of free trade … 
this problem is shared by several less-developed countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
China” (Sato, 2004: 227). In Southeast and Northeast Asia agriculture is politically sensitive 
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sector because it is understood by many countries as a matter of national security; self-
sufficiency and food availability creates a sense of confidence in a region that has 
experienced a number of famines and food crises. According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), as of 2014 about 10.3 percent of the Southeast Asian population was 
undernourished (FAO, 2014). 
Agricultural sector is guarded by influential interest groups that frequently put pressure 
on governments. In Thailand, for instance, because of the vehement opposition of 
agricultural interest groups, the government has had difficulties to pass a reform bill on the 
Rice Support Program, a program that pays above the market price for paddy rice with the 
purpose of raising farmers’ income. The attempt of the Thai government to lower rice price 
sparked big protests from farmers, which finally compelled the Ministry of Commerce to 
assure farmers that high prices would be maintained (FAO, 2013). Despite compelling 
evidence of positive effects that agricultural trade liberalization could materialize (Bandara 
and Yu, 2007; Bandara, 2007; Strutt and Mikic, 2009; Oktaviani and Puspitawati, 2008), in 
Southeast and Northeast Asia it is still difficult to make meaningful progress in liberalizing 
agricultural market. Although AFTA has set a target of zero tariff protection in intra-ASEAN 
trade, the target has set aside a list of sensitive agricultural products including rice. In fact, 
the “big challenge for ASEAN is in the political economy of agriculture trade liberalization; 
trade diversion and creation in a free trade area” (Mangabat and Natividad, 2007: 65). 
In Southeast and Northeast Asia rice consumption is driven “by income growth, 
population, and other socio-demographic variables such as urbanization, changing lifestyles, 
and food preferences” (Wailes and Chavez, 2012: 4). Since the 1960s, rice consumption 
increased substantially in the region. However, since 1990s “strong economic growth in 
many Asian countries, particularly in China and India, halted the upward trend in global per 
capita rice consumption as consumers diversified their diet from rice to high-level products 
such as meat, dairy products, fruits, and vegetables” (Mohanty, 2013: 44).  This trend has 
been especially conspicuous in countries such as South Korea and Japan, where increasing 
income per capita has had a substitution effect from rice to other foods.  
It would be a mistake to bundle all Asian countries together and project them to behave 
like Japan and South Korea as they become wealthier. Each Asian country will be “unique in 
the way it diversifies its consumption pattern as income rises” (Mohanty, 2013: 45). Patterns 
of rice consumption are complex. Rice could be in some cases an inferior good or a Giffen 
good. Given its role and place in the region’s culture and economy, however, rice is expected 
to be a permanent staple food. Even in countries where per capita rice consumption has 
decreased, rice still is a fundamental part of their diet. In fact, it is projected that rice 
consumption will remain equal to population growth rate. Some analysts even points out that 
“in major Asian countries rice consumption will increase faster than the population growth” 
(Papademetriou, 2005: 1). Southeast and Northeast Asia has enough rice to feed its 
population; countries in the region could also satisfy rice demands from importing countries 
without difficulties. As one research suggests, “Thailand and Vietnam [produce] 48.0 percent 
of global net exports…Cambodia and Myanmar have good production potential to expand 
rice exports given the availability of land and water resources” (Wailes and Chavez, 2012: 5). 
According to one estimate, total ASEAN rice output is projected to grow “at 1.37 percent 
annually, from nearly 110.5 million tons in 2012-20111 to 128.3 million tons by 2021-2022” 
(Wailes and Chavez, 2012: 3). With proper regional division of labor in terms of supply and 
demand and with smart policy measures to improve research and technology on rice 
production systems, adequate supply of rice could be maintained in a long term. 





3.2 Economic Effects of Rice Trade Liberalization  
 
Rice trade market is described as “‘thin’, ‘volatile’, ‘segmented’ and ‘highly distorted’” 
(Razzaque and Laurent, 2008: 2). In addition, “the combination of a high degree of 
protection, geographic concentration, market segmentation, and inelastic demand response to 
price and income” makes rice prices volatile and trade volumes fluctuating (Wailes, 2003: 1). 
Although WTO Agreement on Agriculture and FTA negotiations have set agendas to open 
rice market, most countries have found various mechanisms to avoid rice trade liberalization 
at least in the middle term (Yang and Blanford, 2011). 
Trade negotiations between ‘rice haves’ and ‘rice have-nots’ countries stimulate two 
simultaneous governmental reactions; on the one hand, importing countries attempt to limit 
the entry of large amounts of foreign rice through tariffs or quotas, promoting the increase of 
domestic rice production and pursuing self-sufficiency. On the other hand, rice exporting 
countries continuously purchase domestically produced rice using state owned enterprises, 
increasing fictitiously the price of rice and banning rice exports when it seems that the food 
security could be in jeopardy. This situation provokes an atmosphere of distrust and vicious 
cycle; while exporting countries do not show commitments to importers, the latter promote 
more vigorously self-sufficiency. However, certain countries have natural disadvantages over 
others because “less of their land is suited to growing rice,” and this makes it impossible for 
them to “compete at the margin with mainland rice exporters” (Dawe, 2013: 15).
5
 As a 
consequence, rice has remained one of the most distorted and inefficient commodity in trade 
in the region. 
What would happen if regional rice market opened up? Previous researches on this 
subject project different possible scenarios. In general, it is predicted that rice liberalization 
would increase global net welfare gains. According to a research by the Commonwealth’s 
Economic Affairs Division (EAD) on rice trade, rice trade liberalization would improve 
global gains, although “losers and winners among developing countries” would depend on 
“their respective situations, including whether they are net exporters or net importers of rice 
and agricultural products” (Razzaque and Laurent, 2008: 3). Other studies indicate that 
countries having comparative advantages on rice production would benefit more. For 
instance, since “India, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam all have both comparative and 
competitive advantage over China,” these countries would benefit more from rice trade 
liberalization than would China (Illyas et al., 2009). Wailes claims that reform measures to 
remove protection in the global rice market are expected to “result in an increase of 
economic welfare of over USD 7.4 billion per year” (Wailes, 2003: 2). In addition, rice trade 
is estimated to increase by 10 to 15 percent, with a series of disparities depending on 




                                                          
5 Dawe adds that governmental policies for self-sufficiency have four main consequences: 1) prices in 
importing countries are higher than expected, 2) high rice prices together with lack of land need more 
yields and irrigation in importing countries, 3) higher prices encourages the consumption of other 
goods such as wheat, and 4) higher prices increase poverty in importing countries (Dawe, 2013: 15). 
6 The study shows that prices for exporters would be higher (by 20 to 35 percent) whereas price paid by 
importers would be lower (by 10 to 35 percent), depending on the type of rice. In this scenario the 
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Rice trade liberalization in Southeast and Northeast Asian countries could result in a 
better allocation of resources, improving trade efficiency and gains. However, this scenario 
would be possible only if the region created better mechanisms of cooperation and 
integration that would ensure food supply at normal market prices for importing countries, 
including transparent rules and specific agreements for that purpose. It is necessary to work 
regionally on a common strategy for rice trade in order to assist the creation of domestic and 
regional policies that would support competitiveness of rice producers. Such strategy should 
encourage research on rice production and diversity. Research ought to tackle a series of new 
agricultural challenges such as climate change, desertification, urbanization, use of land, and 
population growth. Regional and domestic policies would have to consider the creation of 
safety nets for farmers in importing countries who would have to migrate from rice sector to 
other more competitive industries. Proper policies are need for consumers in exporting 
countries who would have to pay more for rice. Concerted efforts of this kind require not 
only the commitments of national governments, but also coordinated works with nations’ 
international cooperation agencies such as JICA (Japan) and KOICA (Korea), and also with 
UN agencies and commissions with regional presence such as FAO and ESCAP, and 
regional organizations such as ASEAN, the ADB, among others. 
 
 
4. ASSESSING RICE TRADE POLICIES IN SOUTHEAST AND NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
Despite obvious benefits of rice trade liberalization explained in previous section, 
analysis on rice policies of Southeast and Northeast Asian countries show that most countries 
have established a set of robust institutional frameworks on rice – a set of legal structures, 
strategies, specific policies and programs accompanied by budget allocation and other 
resources. As pointed out earlier, countries in the region could be differentiated in terms of 
rice market participation as “rice-having” and “rice not-having” countries. This category can 
be useful to analyze the state of rice-related policies and rice trade policies of different 
countries in the region. Review of national development strategies in the region reveals that 
most countries in the region consider rice as an important part of national policies. For 
instance, Cambodia’s 2014-2018 National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) targets an 
increase in rice production reaching 10.85 million tons by 2018 and boosting rice exports 
through the Policy on the Promotion of Paddy Production and Rice Export . Brunei 
Darussalam has set a rice policy that pursues a 60 percent of rice production increase by 
2015 in 2008 terms. In Indonesia, the National Poverty Reduction Strategy encourages rice 
production in order to mitigate farmers’ poverty rates. Bulog (the state owned enterprise in 
charge of rice market) has set rice procurement target at 95,000 tons for 2013, up from 
74,000 tons in 2012. In Lao PDR the Agricultural Master Plan 2011-2015 set a target of 4.2 
million paddy produced by 2014, increasing rice production in the 47 poorest districts and 
providing an average of 350 Kg per person a year. The 10th Malaysia Plan (2011-2015) has 
established a national target of rice production enough to guarantee 45 days rice stockpile 
and 70 percent level of self-sufficiency by 2015. In addition, the Malaysian 10 year National 
Agro-Food Policy (NAFP) 2011-2020 emphasizes the need of increasing paddy production. 
In Myanmar, the Short-term National Plan 2011-2015 aims to boost crop production  
                                                          
only source of price volatility that remains would be rice market size, which would continue to be 
relatively small compared to other agriculture commodities (Wailes, 2003). 
















New rice fields, improvement of 
rice field infrastructure, 
introducing high yielding variety. 
Increase of 60% of rice 
production. 
Imports are restricted to maintain 
security of domestic supply and price. 
Diversification of rice trade with 
partner countries, such as Vietnam and 
Cambodia. 
Cambodia 
Rice surplus / 
increasing rice 
exports 
Diversification and land reform. 
One million milled rice for export 
by 2015. Rice production reaching 
10.85 million tons by 2018. 
Renewal of 10 rice varieties. 
No import tax and zero import duty on 
rice for ASEAN trade partners. 
Bilateral agreement with Vietnam to 
increase rice exports. 
China PRC 
Rice self- 
sufficiency / rice 
exchange with 
restrictions 
Strengthening of price protection 
institutions. Ensure that annual 
grain production at least 540 tons 
by 2015, machinery and variety 
production subsides. 
Imports under the quota portion are 
subject to a lower, or sometimes zero, 
tariff rate. Imports above the quota’s 
limit face a much higher tariff rate. 
State-owned companies granted with 
50% of the rice-trading permits.  
Indonesia 
Rice stability / rice 
importing country 
Increasing rice production to 
reduce imports. Market 
intervention by distributing low 
price of rice and subsidy program.  
Constraint of rice imports with a 30% 
tariff and centralized rice trade control 
by BULOG. The import duty on rice is 
$50 per ton. 
Japan 
Rice self-
sufficiency / rice 
imports with 
restrictions 
Improving technology on rice 
production including for sowing 
seeds of paddy rice directly in the 
fields. Self-sufficiency in food 
production to 50% by 2020. 
Tariff for rice imports is of 778%. 
Rice imported outside of the minimum 
access framework is charged with 
tariffs. It allows a minimum market 




sufficiency / rice 
export ban 
Target of 4.2 million paddy 
produced by 2014, increasing rice 
production in 47 poorest districts. 
Subsides on fertilizers, millers, 
and yields.  
Tariffs of 20% (AFTA) and 40% 
(AoA), although one company (State 
Food Enterprise) has license of duty 
free rice imports until 2016. Long-
term agreements to import rice in 
exchange of palm oil or oil. 
Malaysia 
Rice stability/ rice 
imports with 
restrictions 
National target of a 45-days rice 
stockpile and 70% level of self-
sufficiency by 2015. Double rice 
yields by 2020. Increasing paddy 
production and varieties. Rice 
subsidies. 
Rice imports monopolized by 
BERNAS and negotiated on a 
government-to-government basis. 
Seeking to reduce tariffs, but so far a 
tariff of 20% has been applied. Tariff 






Surplus goal of 8.3 million 
hectares, average yield 5.15 Mt/Ha 
by 2015 (from 4.6 in 2010). 
Safeguard rights of farmers giving 
price incentives through free trade 
of rice. 
Rice exports have been banned in 
different periods. In 2013 the country 
has shifted the rice trade policy 
seeking surplus of rice to recover 
exporting leadership with a target of 3 
million metric tons by 2017.  
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Table 2. (Continued) 
 
including rice, ensuring rice production surplus for exports, with a goal of 8.3 million 
hectares and an average yield 5.15 Mt/Ha by 2015. The Philippine Development Plan 2011-
2016 set 2015 as the year to reach self-sufficiency. Other interesting case is the Vietnam 
Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2011-2020 where rice is considered a matter of agro-
business, promoting rice production to transform Vietnam into a world top rice exporting 
country. China PRC is seeking a more diverse variety of rice production, ensuring an annual 
grain production of at least 540 tons by 2015, with great subsides on machinery. Japan has 
set self-sufficiency on food of 50 percent by 2020 with a target of 45 percent for rice. South 
Korea seeks to maintain its condition of self-sufficiency with a stockpile that ensures 2 
months consumption.  
Most of Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian countries have established state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to manage rice trade policies (Molina et al., 2012). These national 
enterprises enjoy high degree of autonomy and work as linkage between Ministries of Trade 
and Ministries of Agriculture. This is the case of the National Food Authority (NFA) in the 
Philippines, the Vietnam Food Association (VFA), the Lao State Food Enterprise (SFE), and 
the National Food Logistics Agency (BULOG) of Indonesia. In the case of Malaysia, in 1996 
the Main Market of Burna Malaysia (BERNAS) was privatized, currently acting legally on 
behalf of the government in the maintenance of the nation’s rice stockpile. Among its 
functions, BERNAS purchases paddy from farmers, manages the BUMIPUTERA Rice 
Millers Scheme, and allocates paddy price subsidies to growers. In Northeast Asia, Japan 
Country Rice Policy National Rice Policies International Rice Trade Orientation 
Philippines 
Rice self-
sufficiency / rice 
imports with 
restrictions 
Increase rice self-sufficiency from 
80% in 2010 to 100% in 2015. 
Reduction of post-harvest losses. 
Increasing of palay rice production 
up to 22.73 million of tons by 2016.  
Government determines the amount 
of rice to be imported. Seeking the 
extension of quotas until 2017. 
Imported rice is subject to a 40% 
tariff and duty-free importation is 




sufficiency / rice 
imports with 
restrictions 
Establishing a public stockpiling 
system, maintaining the stockpile 
volume for 2 months consumption. 
Subsidies and target on rice self-
sufficient, accomplished since 2003. 
Two sections of quotas, one quota 
divided between 4 rice exporting 
countries and the other of increments 
for a most-favored-nation. Korea has 
set new import tariff of 513 ptc. since 
2015; above a set quota negotiated 
before. 
Thailand 
Rice surplus / rice 
exports with 
restrictions 
Keeping leadership on rice exports. 
Improving fine rice production. 
Domestic price control through the 
Paddy Pledging Program. Avoiding 
shortages with government 
intervention.  
Keeping Thailand as a high quality 
rice (such as Jasmine) exporting 
country, opening new markets and 
enhancing regional cooperation 
(ASEAN).  
Viet Nam 
Rice surplus / rice 
exports with 
restrictions 
Restricting conversion of 
agricultural land from rice 
cultivation to other purposes. 
Strengthening rice intensive 
cultivation. Enhance production with 
some restrictions. Rice price control. 
Intervention in rice export in case of 
shortages. Ensuring food security 
while liberalizing trade. Engaging in 
regional and international trade 
regimes. Government nominates 
companies to trade with rice export 
markets. 




purchases its rice through the Staple Food Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), whereas in South Korea the same function is performed by 
the Korea Agro-Fishery Trade Corporation. <Table 2> is the summary of rice policies of 
different countries in the region.  
 
 
5. PROSPECTS FOR RICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SOUTHEAST AND 
NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
5.1 Recent Trends in the Region  
 
In recent years, rice exporting countries in the region have set ambitious plans to foster 
rice production, whereas importing countries have opened up rice markets with some 
restrictions. Thailand has lost competitiveness in rice international market, while Vietnam 
is trying to gain terrain in rice exports since 2001 when it established a mixed system of 
liberalized rice trade regime with governmental intervention on rice exports. Cambodia and 
Myanmar are also attempting to procure a greater rice export share. Rice exports in 
Myanmar had been banned until 2013, but the government has recently liberalized 
international rice trade, setting a target of 3 million metric tons for exports by 2017.  
Although Japan and South Korea have to some extent opened up its markets to foreign 
rice, they still pursue protectionist rice policies. Japan agreed to import 770,000 tons of rice 
under the tariff-free state trading, but it imposes a 778 percent tariff on rice imported outside 
the minimum access framework. In recent negotiations, Japan has tried to maintain these 
conditions when negotiating bilaterally with countries with prominent rice sector. During 
negotiations on Transpacific Partnership, the US confirmed that it would allow Japan to keep 
its tariffs on rice but only if Japan would agree to introduce a system to increase American 
rice imports. South Korea has adjusted its rice market to 2005-2014 Doha Development 
Agenda agreements (two sections of quotas, one quota divided between 4 rice exporting 
countries and the other of increments for a most-favored-nation). Korea was attempting to 
conclude DDA negotiations at a level that would be acceptable for Korean rice farmers, but 
recent moves show that the country takes great pains to protect local farmers, setting a new 
tariff of 513 percent in 2015 in a move that has increased criticisms from exporting countries 
including the US. 
China has moved towards a relatively more liberalized rice policy, but still uses Tariff-
Rate Quotas (TRQ) to protect domestically produced rice from competitive importers. 
Imports during a specific time period under the quota portion of a TRQ are usually subject to 
a lower, or sometimes zero, tariff rate. To the contrary, imports above the quota’s 
quantitative limit face a much higher tariff rate. State-owned companies are granted with 50 
percent of the rice-trading permits. Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia and the Philippines use 
trade agreements as policy tools to purchase sufficient amount of rice through licensed firms 
and this mechanism discourages importation of rice. In the context of WTO negotiations, 
countries in the region have used the modalities offered by the Agreement on Agriculture to 
protect rice. Some countries such as Philippines have asked for extension of concessions in 
order to avoid rice trade liberalization.  
The collected information shows that Southeast and Northeast Asian countries have 
created a large number of policy measures safeguard rice market. Most of them are focused 
on self-sufficiency and rice market protection by setting specific targets on rice production. 
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The role of government on these policies is prominent; it acts as investor, seller and buyer of 
rice in several countries. Although most countries in Southeast and Northeast Asia have 
signed agreements on liberalizing agriculture market, in reality rice has been excluded from 
liberalization because it has been tagged as a ‘highly sensitive’ good.  
 
5.2 Evaluating the Future and Recommendations 
   
Rice is a major obstacle in trade liberalization in Southeast and Northeast Asia, because it 
is considered a matter of national security for many countries in the region. Although more 
liberalized rice trade in the region would lead to more efficient allocation of resources, 
thereby promoting better exchange of goods and services in the region, distrust in the 
regional rice trade system has operated as a major stumbling block. Nonetheless, Southeast 
and Northeast Asian countries have shown continuous interests in removing such stumbling 
blocks. How can we cultivate habit of cooperation and build trust in the region? Regional 
institutional fora where interested parties can interact closely would certainly reduce the 
payoffs for cheating and strengthen cooperative behavior (Lianos and Le Blanc, 2011). 
Genuine progress in Asian regional integration is necessary to provide such regional 
institutional fora; it is imperative for rice liberalization and regional integration to move in 
tandem. An effective way to liberalize rice trade is through the establishment of regional 
frameworks that could generate trust and confidence among Southeast and Northeast Asian 
countries in region’s agricultural market. These institutional frameworks should be able to 
address such controversial issues as rice availability, sustainability of production, price 
stability, and social welfare of producers and consumers. 
To mitigate negative impacts of national policies to pursue self-sufficiency and to ensure 
importing countries a continuous supply of rice, regional agencies such as ESCAP and the 
ADB should play a proactive role in creating biding contracts on rice and to mobilize 
“commitments from rice-exporting countries that they will not unilaterally ban the export of 
rice” (Pochara, 2012: 15). If for instance these arrangements become a part of ASEAN+3 
negotiations, a specific institutional body should be created to take charge of the 
administration. Such arrangements have to be specific enough in terms of quantity of rice 
and its type and quality. Arrangements towards food security on rice could get recognition 
from the ASEAN Trade in Good Arrangement (ATIGA) that enforced two obligations: the 
obligation to reduce AFTA’s tariffs and the obligation not to introduce more quotas (Clarete, 
2010). 
Regional integration would provide mechanisms with which the region could counteract 
a host of uncertainties in cases of emergencies. In this regard, ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice 
Reserve should be reinforced by increasing substantially the size of earmarks that are 
presently considered “too small to significantly offset domestic market movements on an 
annual basis” (Briones et al., 2012: 19). However, such increase would be possible only if 
the emergency reserve became active enough to be understood as a credible mechanism to 
address food emergencies. The role of regional agencies is crucial to elicit political will from 
Southeast and Northeast Asian countries towards the reinforcement of such mechanism.  
In order to enhance sustainability of region’s rice market in the long run, it is necessary to 
devise a comprehensive regional strategy on food security that would induce technical 
cooperation to improve rice production in terms of efficiency and quality. Such strategy 
should address such risk factors as climate change, scarcity of land and the increase of costs 
of production. ASEAN, in collaboration with international organizations such as FAO and 




national aid agencies, should assist rice importing countries to enhance agricultural R&D 
capacity that “has remained relatively unchanged over the past two decades” (Beintema and 
Stads, 2008: 1). Regional agencies could coordinate efforts to create a regional rice price 
index and to conduct further studies on rice standardization, price risk and price volatility. 
Regional coordination and cooperation seems to be crucial to stabilize rice price. In addition, 
sharing information about food stocks and projecting region’s rice supply is instrumental to 
prevent speculative behavior and a “self-fulfilling” crisis as an outcome of mutual distrust 
(Clarete, 2012; Timmer, 2009). 
Rice trade liberalization is expected to bring substantial economic benefits to trading 
countries. If importing countries unwind policies on rice self-sufficiency, relying more on 
importers for rice supply, they could negotiate better terms for exports of other items. But it 
should be emphasized that rice liberalization would produce ‘trade losers’ in both importing 
and exporting countries. In exporting countries, where the rice price is expected to increase, 
social safety nets and policies to induce consumption diversification would be needed to 
mitigate negative impacts on consumers; whereas in importing countries, governments 
should prepare policies for timely crop replacement for rice farmers. Reinforcing regional 
governance on rice liberalization would be instrumental in eliciting cooperation among 
countries and fostering norms of reciprocity. That is, a regional framework of cooperation 
and integration would prove to be a key factor that could alleviate political distrust and 
uncertainties among member countries. Current arrangements such as the ASEAN Rice 





In recent decades, regional integration among Southeast and Northeast Asian countries 
has made a genuine progress in the area of trade liberalization due to a number of factors: 
conspicuous policy shift from close to open trade in leading countries, increase in intra-
regional exchanges, and emergence of regional trade blocs and bilateral trade agreements. 
Countries in Southeast and Northeast Asia have lost interests in multilateral trade 
negotiations in the WTO and turned to a more bloc-oriented trade talk; the region as a whole 
has manufactured a new concept of economic unit known as ASEAN+3 and a considerable 
number of FTA’s have been entered into between Southeast and Northeast Asian countries. 
The nature of regional integration has become trade-oriented and FTA-led.  
This process of regional integration through trade agreements has, nonetheless, excluded 
from its negotiations a number of sensitive agricultural products, rice being the most 
noteworthy example. Two factors account for exclusion of rice from trade talks in the region. 
First, rice is a staple food in the region that has cultural and even security implications. 
Because of political relevance of rice in the region, rice policies oftentimes become subject 
to intense interest group politics and heated political debates. Second, after experiencing 
food crises, many countries in the region are still under the impression that rice can be used 
as an important tool of statecraft. Because of this nature of rice, countries feel suspicious 
about motives and integrity of each other’s rice policies. Against this backdrop, it is a small 
wonder that most countries in the region have adopted and still retain protectionist rice 
policies.  
This research shows that rice remains as a key strategic item in trade policies of most 
Southeast and Northeast Asian countries. Many countries intervene in the market to increase 
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production and enhance self-sufficiency on rice. Governments manipulate rice purchasing, 
storage and selling. Some countries have made adjustments to fulfill the requirements of 
AFTA and WTO negotiations. But by designating rice as highly sensitive product, they have 
also come up with policy measures to delay their commitments.   
Given the apparent benefits that rice liberalization could bring to the region, countries in 
the region should exert concerted efforts to break impasse in rice trade negotiations. This 
research suggests that efforts to build regional community and rice trade liberalization move 
in tandem. In order to materialize the benefits of an integrated and liberalized rice market in 
the region, it is required to establish regional governance that would instill confidence in 
region’s rice market and major stakeholders of rice policy. The region’s governance on rice 
has to involve a wide range of actors such as ASEAN+3, SAARC, UN agencies (e.g., FAO 
and ESCAP), the ADB, as well as national agencies of development cooperation, especially 
from industrialized countries such as the Korean KOICA and the Japanese JICA. It is 
suggested that the rice governance in the region address the following issues: 1) rice 
availability to give assurance to rice importing countries and to strengthen the ASEAN+3 
Emergency Rice Reserve, 2) sustainability of production to assist rice producing countries 
and to improve rice quantity and quality, 3) price stability by establishing a regional rice 
price information system, and 4) protection of producers and consumers to help governments 
protect and support the ‘losers’ that rice trade liberalization could bring about. 
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